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His Last Work and His Last Days
Charles Reagan
This book was Paul Ricoeur’s last book, written when he was suffering from a series
of  old-age related illnesses.In spite of  this, he kept to his daily schedule, spending the
mornings in his study and the late afternoons receiving colleagues and visitors. The
book was published in French less than one year before he died. Since this was the
last of  his philosophical works, I want to begin and end this paper with some
personal notes. I put these notes in italics so that a reader who wants only the
philosophical discussion can go directly to that text.
It may seem strange that Ricoeur would begin a book by a catalogue of
dictionary meanings and the different order in which two different dictionaries put
these meanings. There are two reasons for this: in the Ricoeur home, a dictionary sat
on the dining table and was referred to frequently to make a point, to answer a
question, to start a philosophical argument, or even end one. Second, Ricoeur took
seriously the idea that philosophical issues lie in everyday language and that our
language is not purely neutral, but represents the sedimentation of  once-living metaphors
and ways of  thinking.
With respect to the word “recognition,” I recall discussing its meanings
with him as early as 1992. At this point, he was fascinated with the word and all of
its meanings, but he did not think that there was a coherent philosophical theory of
“recognition” that could put into a rational semantic order the various meanings. We
talked about the different meanings as if  they were completely different words. At
one time, we would talk about recognizing an object or a person, other times about
the desire to be recognized. In one conversation then, and another conversation a
decade later, we spent time thinking and discussing “recognition” in the sense of
recognizing the authority of  a state or government. Interestingly, this meaning is
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absent from his analysis and I will make this point in my critique. Thus, I was not
surprised that he would write a book about “recognition,” but amazed that he was
capable of  doing so in his last days.
In June of  2004, I went to Paris to visit Paul only to find that he was just
out of  the hospital where he had spent several weeks with heart problems complicated
by an infection. I thought it was the last time I would see him alive. He was very
weak and his voice so soft I could barely hear him. In retrospect, I believe that
finishing this book left him in a weak state. The difference was that, at the end of  his
previous books, he announced the unfinished business and the outlines of  his next
projects. He was always left with unanswered questions and new issues to explore in
his next book. This book ends without any such announcement of  a new project.
But, this book also showed one of  his most admirable traits: he mustered the strength
and the courage to tackle one last philosophical problem that had been on his mind
for many years.
Ricoeur begins his search for the meanings of  “recognition”
by consulting the dictionary. He is struck by the progression of  meanings
and gaps such that “...the definitions run together in such a workable
way that the derivation seems to flow like a continuous stream of
meanings.”1 For his lexicographical study, Ricoeur chooses the two
great dictionaries of  the French language, the Dictionaire de la langue
française, published by Emile Littré between 1859 and 1872 and usually
called just the “Littré.” The second dictionary he consulted was the
Grand Robert de la langue française, second edition, published in 1985. It is
called the “Robert” and the abridged version used commonly is called
the “Petit Robert.”
In his Preface, and even more clearly in an article of  March 1,
1880 (“How I made my dictionary of  the French language”) Littré
says, “I claim nothing less than to give a monograph for each word,
that is, an article where everything that we know about each word as
regards its origin, its form, its meaning, and its use should be presented
to readers. This has never been done before.”2 What Ricoeur is searching
for is the rule-governed polysemy which links, in a rational progression,
the twenty-three meanings of  the word “recognition” in the Littré. I
cannot, of  course, go through all of  the meanings in this paper, but I
have chosen several which will have philosophical importance as Ricoeur
lays out the multiple roles the word has in different, but related, contexts.
“1. To bring again to mind the idea of  someone or something
one knows [connaît]. I recognize the style. To recognize people by their voice, their
bearing.”3 This is the first of  the meanings that we can call, “epistemic”
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since they have to do with knowing or discovering. “2. To know by
some sign, some mark, some indication, a person or a thing one has
never seen before. By her bearing, one recognizes a goddess. To recognize a plant
on the basis of  the description given in a book.” What is important here is the
sign, mark, indication, characteristic, which makes identification or
recognition possible. “3. To arrive at, to catch sight of, to discover the
truth of  something. People recognized his innocence. One recognizes healthy
water by these signs. One recognizes their bad faith.” This meaning brings in
the idea of  a truth claim and so is still in the group of  meanings we can
call “epistemic” in that they have to do with knowledge.
By the time we get to meaning twelve listed in Littré, “to
recognize” in the order of  filiation, such as in recognizing a child as
one’s own is not just identification, but also the conferring of  a right.
This meaning is in the area we can call the “moral.” Meaning fifteen is
to avow or to confess, “perhaps a mistake, a debt, an error”(8). Meaning
sixteen, to have appreciation or gratitude (as when one might say in
French, “Je suis très reconnaissant”), does not exist in many other languages,
although in English it is used, for example, in recognizing someone for
their gift. (“We would like to recognize Mr. and Mrs. Smith for their
gift to the children’s fund.”)
In the course of  this summary of  meanings of  the word
“recognize,” Ricoeur marks an important distinction which will be
present throughout his analyses: “...my working hypothesis concerning
a possible derivation of  meaning on the conceptual plane finds some
more encouragement and support in one significant aspect of  the
enunciation of  the verb as verb–that is, its use in the active voice: to
recognize something, objects, persons, oneself, one another–or in the
passive voice: to be recognized, to ask to be recognized.”4 This is the
dividing line between meanings which can be called “epistemic” and
ones which are “moral.”
The Robert says, “To grasp (an object) with the mind, through
thought, in joining together images, perceptions having to do with it;
to distinguish or identify the judgment or action, know it by memory.”5
Ricoeur calls this use “identify/distinguish.” The first of  his three essays
on recognition is devoted to recognition as identification. Ricoeur then
takes us on one of  his typical itineraries through the history of
philosophy on this topic, from Plato to Descartes and then to a very
long and detailed account of  Kant and his introduction of  the condition
of  time to the understanding of  the mental act of  recognizing. He
then changes his approach in an interesting way, asking: what can mis-
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recognition teach us about recognition? He refers to Proust’s Time
Regained and the episode of  the Prince de Guermantes’ dinner where
all of  the guests are his old acquaintances and friends, but are devastated
by old age and appear to be wearing disguises. Ricoeur says, “The work
of  recognition must struggle with the threat of  the unrecognizable.”6
The second of  the three essays which make up this book is
devoted to “recognizing oneself.” He begins with an account of  the
household recognizing Oedipus, little by little after his return, first by
the dog which recognized his master right off. He moves through
Aristotle and the recognition of responsibility and then centers his
discussion on the “reflexive consciousness of  oneself.” Here he returns
to a distinction he makes in his book, Oneself  as Another between the
self  as idem and self  as ipse.7  The former is identity through time by a
sameness of  appearance, characteristics, or style through which we
recognize someone as the same person on different occasions, even
though time has changed some of  those features. The latter is a
constancy of  character through time, in spite of  all of  the changes of
appearances. Ricoeur says that the promise is the most sure sign of  this
kind of  sameness. I am committed to keeping my promise, even though
the circumstances have changed, even though you and I have changed,
even though our wants, needs, and desires have changed. The marriage
vow is the ultimate form of  this kind of  self-identity. He refers back to
the Robert: “to avow, confess, approve.” This is the “transition in meaning
from recognition-identification to recognition-avowal.”8 At the heart
of  self-recognition is the understanding of  the capacities to say and to
do which constitute the “capable human being recognizing himself  in
his capacities.”9
Ricoeur’s analysis of  self-recognition is advanced by the role
of  memory and promises: “In memory and promises, the problematic
of  self-recognition reaches two high points simultaneously. The one is
turned toward the past, the other toward the future. But they need to
be considered together within the living present of  self-recognition,
thanks to several features they have in common.”10 Memory is linked
to the notion of  sameness, idem, while promising is the paradigmatic
case of  ipséité. “Finally, and this is not the least of  their features, both
are affected by the threat of  something negative that is constitutive of
their meaningfulness: forgetting for memory, betrayal for promises.”11
In the third essay, Ricoeur moves from self-recognition to
mutual recognition of  the other. In Husserlian phenomenology, mutual
recognition begins with the self  and is extended to the other. For
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Levinas, it is the other way around. I come to self-recognition through
the recognition of  the other. I am going to pass over a very interesting
account of  Hobbes and a very tedious account of  Hegel on mutual
recognition. But, I do want to turn my attention to an interesting passage
about naming as a form of  recognition: “In one sense, every birth
welcomed is an adoption, not only by the father, but also by the mother,
as soon as she has accepted or chosen to ‘keep’ this fetus becomes ‘her’
baby and to give birth to it. Both these adoptions were authorized by
the system transmitting a family name and choosing a given name for
me.”12 Recognition by others continues through the birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, and passport.
The analysis moves from recognition by the other on the
personal level to the recognition of  the other on the social level, and
then on the juridical level. Here, the other is seen as having rights,
protections of  self  and property, and the status to share equitably in
the goods and burdens of  citizenship. From the juridical level of
recognition, Ricoeur passes to the level of  social esteem, to be valued
by others. “The most complete model of  a recognition of  superiority
has to be sought in the relationship between a teacher and a disciple.”13
Here, the words of  the teacher have authority; the teacher is recognized
as an authority.
Another social form of  recognition is that of  identity-politics,
the recognition of  others as groups, such as minorities, the marginal,
the different, or the strangers. The rise of  multiculturalism in the United
States stems from the demand by groups to be recognized as equals
and therefore as deserving of  equal rights and respect. Many times, the
refusal of  recognition by others is internalized by members of  these
groups as self-depreciation, the opposite of  self-esteem. The perpetual
question is when does a person think and feel that he or she is truly
recognized and esteemed? “Does not the claim for affective, juridical,
and social recognition, through its militant, conflictual style, end up as
an indefinite demand, a kind of  ‘bad infinity’?”14 Ricoeur says that the
temptation is a form of  the “unhappy consciousness” resulting from a
perpetual sense of  victimization or persistent pursuit of  some
unattainable ideal.
Ricoeur illuminates the paradoxes and difficulties of  mutual
social recognition by reference to the writings of  anthropologists on
the practice of  mutual gift giving among some peoples such as the
Maori of  New Zealand. I am not going to go into this analysis because
I do not see that it illuminates the question of  mutual recognition as
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much as Ricoeur does. It is also a place in the book where Ricoeur’s
writing is dense, even obscure, and somewhat tortured. His usual clarity
and eloquence is missing. He concludes this section by saying, “The
struggle for recognition perhaps remains endless.”15
Here, I would like to bring to the discussion a very insightful
section in Ricoeur’s book, Fallible Man where he speaks of  the “restless
heart,” always trapped between its enormous possibilities and its limited
actuality.16 He refers to the heart which was for the Greeks the seat of
the emotions or feelings. He speaks of  avoir, pouvoir, valoir, to have or
possess, power or capability, and esteem. His question is when will I
have enough and when will my possessions be secure? When will my
power and my position be secure? And, when will others esteem me
and appreciate me for what I am? Ricoeur’s answer is that we will never
have enough and it is always liable to theft or loss; even the most powerful
fall from grace or are removed from power; and, we will never receive
the appreciation we believe that we are due from others. This analysis
takes us full circle back to the question of  social recognition and mutual
recognition and the extent to which our self-recognition depends on
recognition by others.
What Ricoeur has not addressed is, in my mind, one of  the
most important meanings of  recognition, namely, to recognize a political
authority. He did touch on the recognition of  authority in the sense of
the teacher or expert whose authority is based solely on his/her
knowledge, technical expertise, experience, training, etc. But, this type
of  authority is not the same as political authority. We speak, for example,
of  recognizing a new state or a new government (Bosnia-Herzegovina
or the government of  Afghanistan). What is at issue is recognizing a
political authority as legitimate. This form of  recognition engenders its
own paradox: Do we recognize a political authority (President, Dictator,
Prime Minister, or King) because he or she is legitimate, or does the
recognition by others create the legitimacy? Diplomats and political
scientists have invented the distinction of  government de facto and
government de jure. The first is the government which is in fact in
power, whether by a coup or an election. The second refers to a
government which is legitimate, even though it may not actually be in
power, say a government in exile. An example of  this distinction would
be the Vichy government of  Maréchal Pétain, installed by the Germans
in World War II, and the Free French government in exile led by General
Charles De Gaulle. Political recognition and the question of  sovereignty
is a central issue in the discussion of  “recognition,” so it is odd that it
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does not attract much of  Ricoeur’s attention in this book.
Here it may be instructive to turn to an English language
dictionary to see the entry on “recognition.” I begin by referring to
Webster’s Universal Dictionary of  the English Language (1937):
Recognition. 1. Acknowledgment; formal avowal; as, the
recognition of  a final concord on a writ of  covenant.
2. Acknowledgment; solemn avowal by which a thing is
owned or declared to belong to, or by which the
remembrance of  it is revived.
3. Knowledge confessed or avowed; as, the recognition of  a
thing present; also memory of  it as passed.
4. The act of  recognizing; a knowing again.
This series of  definitions begins with a legal sense of  recognition and
then to the avowal sense, for example, to recognize a child as one’s
own. Only when we get to the last two meanings do we see the
epistemological sense arise. Interestingly, in the same dictionary, the
word, “recognize” begins with the epistemological meaning, goes to
the avowal meaning, and includes the sense of  appreciation or gratitude
missing from the definition of  “recognition.” It will be instructive to
quote this entry in its entirety:
Recognize. 1. To recall or recover the knowledge of; to
perceive the identity of, with a person or thing formerly
known; to know again.
Then first he recognized the ethereal guest. –Pope
2. To avow or admit a knowledge of; to acknowledge
formally; as, he would not recognize he as an ambassador.
...
3. To indicate one’s acquaintance with (a person), by a
bow, a nod, lifting the hat, and the like; as, he passed me
without recognizing me.
4. To indicate appreciation of; as, his townsmen recognized
his merit by electing him mayor.
5. To review; to reexamine; to take cognizance of  anew.
So, one may ask, where is the philosophical meat? Why is this a
philosophical topic, rather than just an exercise in philology in the
classical sense? There are three distinct sets of  philosophical problems
related to the concept of  “recognition.” First, the epistemological sense
ties recognition to knowledge and to memory. To recognize as...is to
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understand what something is, while to recognize someone or
something is to recall it. I cannot review all of the questions about
memory that Ricoeur discussed at length in his book, Memory, History,
Forgetting, but to recall and to recognize are both fraught with
philosophical questions, such as distinguishing true memory from false
memory. To recognize is the counterpart of  to mis-recognize, or to fail
to recognize.
The second set of  meanings form a cluster that Ricoeur calls
“moral” in that they involve self-recognition and other-recognition,
whether one starts from the pole of  the self  or the pole of  the other as
Emmanuel Levinas does. The meaning related to expressing gratitude
or appreciation falls into this category.
The third set of  meanings are what I call the “political” since
they involve recognition on the social and political level, especially the
recognition of  governments and groups. In the latter case, identity
politics is centered on the question of recognition and respect for the
other. What is common to all of  the uses of  recognition is that they all
involve an act of  judgment: it is this and not that; I remember him
even though his appearance has changed; I understand my obligations
to him; and it is a legitimate government. In each case, mis-recognition
is always a possibility.
At the end of  each of  his major works, Ricoeur had the habit
of  summarizing the questions answered and the problems or aporias
requiring more work. He would announce the topic of  his next book
and the reader could follow the itinerary of  his philosophical research,
not because it was all planned out in advance, but because one set of
questions led to another. This book does not end this way. In fact, it
ends with a quotation from Montaigne mourning his friend La Boétie:
In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend
with each other so completely that they efface the seam
that joined them and cannot find it again. If  you press me
to tell you why I loved him, I feel that it cannot be
expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because
it was I.17
Since this was Ricoeur’s last book, I feel it is appropriate to describe his
last days. As I mentioned in the beginning of  this paper, when I saw him in June of
2004, I thought it would be the last time. However, in November that year, he
learned that he had won the Kluge Prize from the U.S. Library of  Congress, a
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prize equivalent to the Nobel prizes, with a $1 million honorarium which he shared
with Jaroslav Pelikan, a Yale theologian and historian of  religion. Paul could not
travel to the award ceremony, so he made a videotape of  his acceptance speech, done
in his living room at Chatenay-Malabry. David Pellauer, Ricoeur’s long-time
translator, was asked by Paul to accept the award for him, and Catherine Goldenstein,
his best friend in his waning days, went as his personal representative. I attended the
ceremony and when I saw the strength and effort he put into the videotape, I knew
that I should go back to Paris for one last visit. This I did at the end of  February
2005, just in time for his 92nd birthday.
During the week I was there, I went to Chatenay each afternoon around
4:00pm and we would have tea and conversation. He was physically weak but
mentally alert, and our conversations ranged, as they always did, from the book he
was reading to current events. I would leave at 7:00pm when a young Czech student
living in the apartment downstairs would come up to have dinner with him.
This time when I left Paris, I knew that I would never see him again–
after 43 years as his student, colleague, friend, and confidant. And, I was right.
Catherine Goldenstein called me on Friday, May 20, 2005, to tell me that Paul
had died in his sleep. I left the next day for Paris.
After arriving in Paris, I went directly to Paul’s house to speak with his
children. When I arrived at Les Murs Blancs (the property where Paul owned an
apartment), I was greeted by Jean-Paul, Marc, Noëlle, and Etienne. I sat in the
living room and had a conversation with Paul’s children. I asked them the difference
between the French words, “funeraille” and “obseques”. Out came the Robert and
the discussion began. The result was that both words refer to the same funeral rites
but “funeraille” generally refers to a state funeral or one with extraordinary pomp,
for example, a public funeral of  a statesman. “Les obseques” refers to all of  the
events surrounding a funeral. We all had a good laugh that we had been trained by
Paul to consult the dictionary to settle questions of  meaning.
I had met Jean-Paul, Paul’s oldest son, only once, in 1977, at dinner at
Les Murs Blancs. At the time, their rift, caused by Jean-Paul being a Lacanian
psychiatrist and the Lacanians being vitriolic opponents of  Paul, had been healed
and I challenged Jean-Paul on some of  the main issues of  Lacanism. He answered
me with patience and charm. It was hard for me to believe that it had been so long.
Marc, on the other hand, I had seen on many occasions, when I was staying at the
house in Chatenay and he was working in Paris. Noëlle and I had been at Les
Murs Blancs and at the Ricoeur’s summer home at the same time on a couple of
occasions, so I had seen her more often and more recently than Jean-Paul. Etienne,
the youngest son and I had seen one another from time to time over the years, at
Préfailles and at Chatenay. When I lived in Paris in the mid-1970s, I knew
Etienne and his late brother, Olivier, quite well since they lived in the apartment
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below the Ricoeur’s and we had them to dinner many times.
Marc went through the order of  events for the funeral the next day, and
Etienne drove me to Catherine Goldenstein’s house where she had prepared dinner
for some of  the friends of  Paul’s. Father Franz Vansina—to whom Paul dedicated
The Course of  Recognition—was one of  Paul’s oldest friends. Father Vansina
had written the very first dissertation on Ricoeur. Also attending were Jerome Poirée,
a professor at the University of  Rennes, Hans-Christophe Askani, a theologian at
the University of  Geneva, Olivier Abel, professor of  theology and philosophy at the
Institute of  Protestant Theology of  Paris, Catherine’s husband, Jean-Pierre, and
myself.
Catherine Goldenstein was a friend of  the Ricoeur’s from the Protestant
temple of  Chatenay-Malabry. Beginning in the early 1990s, she would come in the
afternoon to take tea with the Ricoeur’s. She was a devoted companion to Simone
and aided Paul immensely during the period of  Simone’s decline and death. She was
an extraordinary friend who encouraged Paul during his bereavement. She helped
him with his correspondence, made appointments for his friends’ visits, and managed
the household. In the last few years of  his life, Catherine supervised his medical
appointments and treatments and visited him daily. I know from Paul himself  that,
without Catherine Goldenstein and her husband Jean-Pierre, he would have died
many years sooner. All of  us who were friends of  Paul’s and loved and admired him
owe her a debt of  gratitude.
After a light supper, all of  us left, worn out by our travels and the
emotion of  Paul’s death. According to the arrangements, I was picked up just
outside the RER station Bourg’ la Reine and went with Olivier Abel and others in
Hans-Christophe’s car to the cemetery for the private burial service. Only the family
and some close friends were invited. In the Huguenot tradition, the burial takes place
before the memorial service. French Protestants believe that Catholics make a fetish
of  the body by having it present during the funeral service. In an open area just inside
the cemetery, the casket was unloaded from the hearse and put on stands and surrounded
by flowers. Father Vansina said some prayers. He was followed by Philippe Kabongo,
the pastor of  the Reformed Church of  Chatenay-Malabry, who said some more
prayers. Then, four men from the funeral home lifted the casket on their shoulders
and walked to the grave site, with the family following next and then the few invited
friends. At the gravesite, both Pastor Kabongo and Father Vansina said more
prayers and the casket was lowered into the grave with ropes. Then, we all filed out
and went in cars to the Reformed Church for the memorial service.
The church—or “temple” as it is called by the parishioners - was most
unusual: It was underground, like in a basement of  a church that was never finished.
Plain concrete block walls painted white. No adornment of  any kind. In the front
RICOEUR’S LAST WORK AND DAYS
19
was a piano and a table and a lectern. The large crowd found seats on folding chairs.
My impression was that the whole effort was to be counter the Catholic tradition of
ornate churches, with paintings and statues, with pews and an elevated pulpit. The
service consisted in alternating music, prayers, and eulogies. They were given by
Geneviève Fraisse, the daughter of  the Ricoeur’s neighbors and friends, Paul and
Simone Fraisse, who preceded Paul in death. She represented all of  the neighbors at
Les Murs Blancs. The next speaker was Olivier Abel, a long-time friend of  Paul’s
and the son of  the previous pastor of  the Reformed Church of  Chatenay-Malabry.
He has written extensively on Paul’s works and directed an hour-long documentary
on Paul shown on French television. The final speaker was Antoine Garapon, the
jurist who got Paul to give lectures on justice in the Advanced School for Judges in
Paris. The papers he gave there are collected in the two volumes of  The Just.18
When the service was finished, people mingled in the foyer of  the temple
and then went to Les Murs Blancs by car or on foot. There, a table was spread with
food and there was more conversation. I returned to Paris to reflect on my loss: I met
Paul Ricoeur 43 years before when he was a professor at the Sorbonne and I was one
of  his students. We really got acquainted when he came to Kansas State University
to give a lecture in 1973, and he invited my wife and me to stay in his house the next
year when we were on sabbatical leave in Paris. There we got to know all of  his
children and became special friends of  Olivier. We returned to the house in the
spring of  1975 and then spent a month in the Ricoeur summer home at Préfailles.
A year later, we returned to France and spent a month at Les Murs Blancs before
going to Toulouse where I was professor of  philosophy for a year. Then, every summer,
I went to Paris to see Paul, to buy books and to get his latest articles for my research.
For 25 years, I visited Paul in Paris and many times I went to Chicago for a visit
when he and Simone were there. During my many visits to see Paul, we would take
long walks in the afternoon, to the Parc de Sceaux or the Parc de Chateaubriand, or,
in Chicago the preferred walk was along Lake Michigan. I became his confidante
and he discussed his personal situations with me as well as his philosophical work.
I will return to Paris, but for the first time in over forty years, it will not be
to visit Paul Ricoeur.
 Kansas State University
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